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INTRODUCTION
In its tax cases, the Court of Claims displayed two distinctive ten-
dencies. The first was to ignore technical arguments and to decide
cases on the basis of equitable considerations.' The second was to
act independently: to make new law, 2 to disagree with circuit courts
* © 1986 William S. Blatt.
** Attorney, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Washington, D.C. A.B., (1978), Dartmouth
College; J.D., (1982), Harvard Law School. I wish to thankJulie Gilbert, Susan Nash, Roger
Pies, and Norman Schwartz for their comments on an earlier draft of this article. The views
expressed in this article are mine alone.
1. See Brown, Tax Refund Cases in the Court of Claims, 32 ANN. N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N
1305, 1307 (1974) (Court of Claims has "tendency to disregard technical tax rules and de-
cides cases on the basis of what is fair"); Jones, Choice of Forum in Tax Litigation Revisited, 35
ANN. N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 373, 377 (1977) (Court of Claims is more willing than the
Tax Court to take equitable arguments into consideration, even if large amounts are in-
volved); Pavenstedt, The United States Court of Claims as a Forum for Tax Cases, 15 TAx L. REV.
201, 228 (1960) (recognizing Court of Claims' evident desire to disregard technical rules if
taxpayer can show he has paid more taxes than government, in good conscience, should re-
tain). But see Miller, Tax Litigation in the Court of Claims, 55 GEo. LJ. 454, 476-77 (1966) (few
generalizations regarding Court of Claims' attitude in tax cases may be supported
objectively).
2. See Brown, supra note 1, at 1307 (Court of Claims "has not hesitated to make new law
in order to reach most equitable result"); Pavenstedt, supra note 1, at 228 (recognizing Court
of Claims' willingness to make "new law" to prevent unjust enrichment).
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and the Internal Revenue Service (Service), and to override existing
administrative practice.
3
The cases of a single year provide a thin sample from which to
determine whether the Federal Circuit shares theses tendencies. In
1985, that circuit decided only thirteen tax cases and made substan-
tive contributions in only six areas: partnership taxation,4 income
tax accounting, 5 international taxation,6 taxation of tax-exempt enti-
ties,7 taxation of cooperatives, and insurance company taxation.8
Obviously, such a small selection cannot conclusively establish
broad generalizations about the court's jurisprudence.
Nonetheless, the opinions issued during 1985 had a distinct flavor
reminiscent of the Court of Claims. Foremost in these decisions was
an attraction to equity. Frequently, the Federal Circuit adopted the
rule that accorded with general tax principles or common sense.9 In
thus proceeding, it did not feel bound by technical language, but
rather read words broadly10 and gave them different meanings in
different contexts. 1' The court also read the Internal Revenue Code
in part materia,t2 and added freely to statutory or regulatory lan-
guage.13 Related to the court's adoption of equitable principles was
3. SeeJones, supra note 1, at 377 (Court of Claims may be less reluctant than Tax Court
to override established administrative practices not clearly supported in law or regulation).
4. See infra notes 19-61 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 62-82 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 83-110 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 111-48 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 149-66 and accompanying text.
9. See Coplin v. United States, 761 F.2d 688, 691-92 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that Pan-
amanian government did not negotiate for relief of United States citizens from United States
tax), cert. granted sub nom. O'Connor v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 784 (1986).
10. See Hughes Properties, Inc. v. United States, 760 F.2d 1292, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(reading all events test broadly), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 2092 (1986); General Dynamics Corp. v.
United States, 773 F.2d 1224, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (same), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2913
(1986); Greenacre Found. v. United States, 762 F.2d 965, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (reading
"used" in statute to include potential use).
11. See Holiday Village Shopping Center v. United States, 773 F.2d 276, 279 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (treating partnership as aggregate or as entity depending on context); American Bar
Endowment v. United States, 761 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (defining unrelated busi-
ness taxable income differently for business leagues and charities), rev'd 106 S. Ct. 2426
(1986); Greenacre Found. v. United States, 762 F.2d 965, 967 (Fed. Cir, 1985) (acknowledg-
ing that "used" has different meanings in different parts of Code).
12. See Raphan v. United States, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir.) (reading principle of section
707 into section 752 regulations), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 129 (1985); Holiday Village Shopping
Center v. United States, 773 F.2d 276, 280 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (extending principle of section
751 to nonrecognition transaction).
13. See Raphan v. United States, 759 F.2d 879, 885 (Fed. Cir.) (adding condition that
personal liability be in capacity as partner to regulation permitting limited partner to share in
liability for which no partner has personal liability), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 129 (1985); Holiday
Village Shopping Center v. United States, 773 F.2d 276, 280-81 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (adding
partnership interest to list of depreciable property); American Bar Endowment v. United
States, 761 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (adding to tax on unrelated business income an
exemption for fundraising programs), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2426 (1986).
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its heavy reliance on the doctrine of substance over form14 and its
willingness to reach results amenable to business needs. 15
But the picture emerging from the Federal Circuit's 1985 tax
opinions may not have coincided exactly with that of the Court of
Claims. Although the Federal Circuit shared the Court of Claims'
attraction to equity, it may have displayed less independence than
its predecessor. The Federal Circuit was not swayed easily by reve-
nue rulings or the opinions of other circuits, 16 but ultimately acqui-
esced to Treasury regulation and executive position. 17 This
acquiescence may have been due to a deferential attitude or simply a
favorable disposition toward the equitable arguments for adminis-
trative convenience present in those cases. 18
I. TAXATiON OF PARTNERSHIPS
Perhaps the most distinctive Federal Circuit decisions involved
partnership taxation. In two highly visible opinions, the Federal
Circuit read the Code in pari materia. Drawing upon general princi-
ples contained in analogous sections, the court freely added to the
14. See Holiday Village Shopping Center v. United States, 773 F.2d 276, 279 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (recapturing depredation despite form of transaction as distribution of partnership in-
terest); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 761 F.2d 666, 669 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(finding character of insurance business unchanged by use of partnership form).
15. See General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 773 F.2d 1224, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(finding all events test met for self-insured medical claims when medical services provided
calculating deduction for such claims in the aggregate rather than individually), cert. granted,
106 S. Ct. 2913 (1986); Cotter and Co. v. United States, 765 F.2d 1102, 1106-07 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (permitting characterization of investment and rental income as patronage sourced
when accumulation of such income is prompted by business needs); Hughes Properties, Inc.
v. United States, 760 F.2d 1292, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding all events test met for progres-
sive slot machines when jackpots registered thereon), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 2092 (1986).
16. See General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 773 F.2d 1224, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(reaching result contrary to revenue ruling), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2913 (1986); American
Bar Endowment v. United States, 761 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (distinguishing cases
of three circuits), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2426 (1986); Hughes Properties, Inc. v. United States, 760
F.2d 1292, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (disagreeing with Ninth Circuit), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 2092
(1986).
17. See Thomas Int'l Ltd. v. United States, 773 F.2d 300, 304-05 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (up-
holding regulation treating commissions receivable as qualified export assets only if paid
within 60 days), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1261 (1986); Greenacre Found. v. United States, 762
F.2d 965, 967-68 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (upholding regulation treating property that generally pro-
duces interest, dividends, rents, and royalties as in fact used for such production). See also
Coplin v. United States, 761 F.2d 688, 691-92 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (deferring to executive inter-
pretation of treaty), cert. granted sub nom. O'Connor v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 784 (1986);
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 761 F.2d 666, 669 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (relying
on treasury regulation).
The Court of Claims was also perceived as a taxpayer court. SeeJones, supra note 1, at 377;
Pavenstedt, supra note 1, at 228. Regardless of the accuracy of this perception, it is difficult to
discern any such tendency in the Federal Circuit in 1985. Nine of its thirteen decisions held
for the government.
18. See Thomas Int'l Ltd. v. United States, 773 F.2d 300, 304-05 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (up-
holding easily administered regulation), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1261 (1986); Greenacre Found.
v. United States, 762 F.2d 965, 967-68 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (same).
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literal language of the Code and regulations. Not unexpectedly,
these cases sparked congressional reaction.
The first partnership opinion was Raphan v. United States.19 The
principal issue there was whether limited partners could include in
the tax basis of their partnership interests, their share of nonre-
course 20 indebtedness guaranteed by the general partners. 2' The
Code provides that a partner's basis in a partnership interest in-
cludes an amount equal to the partner's share of partnership liabili-
ties, but is silent as to the effect of liabilities on a limited partner's
basis in a partnership interest. The regulations allow a limited part-
ner to include liabilities in basis in one situation: "[wihere none of
the partners have any personal liability with respect to a partnership
liability ... then all partners, including limited partners, shall be
considered as sharing such liability." 22 The question presented in
Raphan was whether a guarantee by the general partner gave rise to
personal liability with respect to a partnership liability within the
meaning of the regulation so as to prevent the limited partners from
sharing the liability.
Judge Kozinski of the Claims Court held that the limited partners
could include their share of the debt in basis notwithstanding the
general partner's guarantee of that debt.2 3 Relying on the general
principle of section 707(a) 24 that transactions undertaken by a part-
ner in a capacity other than as a partner are to be considered as
occurring between the partnership and one who is not a partner,2 5
Judge Kozinski read into the regulation the requirement that a per-
sonal liability be assumed in the general partner's "capacity as part-
ner" in order to preclude the limited partners from sharing in the
liability.2 6 Judge Kozinski apparently adopted a per se rule that the
19. 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir.), cerl. denied, 106 S. Ct. 129 (1985).
20. A "nonrecourse" liability is one for which no one is personally liable. WILLIS, PEN-
NELL & PASTLEWArrE, PARTNERSHIP TAXArON, § 43.04 (3d ed. 1986). Conversely, a "re-
course" liability is one for which someone is personally liable. Id. at § 43.01.
21. Raphan v. United States, 759 F.2d 879, 884-86 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 129
(1985).
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1960).
23. Raphan v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 457, 461 (1984), aff'd, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir.),
cen. denied, 106 S. Ct. 129 (1985).
24. Unless stated otherwise, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
as amended.
25. I.R.C. § 707(a) (1984) ("If a partner engages in a transaction with a partnership
other than in his capacity as a member of such partnership, the transaction shall, except as
otherwise provided in this section, be considered as occurring between the partnership and
one who is not a partner").
26. See Raphan v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 457, 465 (1984) ("that test is whether, in as-
suming [the] liability, the general partner is securing rights and assuming responsibilities
which are separate from, and independent of, his role as partner"), aff'd, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 129 (1985).
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guarantee of a partnership debt is not an act taken in a partner ca-
pacity. He reasoned that if the partnership defaulted on the loan,
the guarantor would have to pay the entire debt and would become
"effectively a creditor vis-a-vis the partnership, with rights antitheti-
cal to his status as a partner." 27
The Federal Circuit reversed Judge Kozinski's decision.28 Like
Judge Kozinski, the court was willing to read into the regulation the
requirement that the assumption of personal liability be made in the
partner's capacity as such.29 The court disagreed, however, with
Judge Kozinski's per se rule that guarantees are not made in a part-
ner capacity,3 0 and held that for a guarantee to be made in a non-
partner capacity, it must be made on arms length terms.31 Applying
this standard to the facts before it, the court found that the guaran-
tee was not made on arms length terms because the general part-
ners guaranteed the loan simply to profit through their partnership
interests.3 2
The government did not view Raphan favorably. After issuance of
the Claims Court opinion, the Service held in Revenue Ruling 83-
15133 that a nonrecourse loan guaranteed by a general partner did
not increase the limited partners' bases in their partnership inter-
ests. It did so only after noting that "the guaranty by [the general
partner makes him] personally liable to the extent that the value of
the property securing the loan is insufficient to cover the amount
due."3 4 Later, in the Tax Reform Act of 1984,35 Congress an-
nounced that "section 752 ... shall be applied without regard to the
result reached in the case Raphan v. United States."3 6 The legislative
history indicated that no inference was to be drawn regarding the
validity of Raphan for transactions prior to March 19, 1984. 37
Despite congressional action, the dust has not settled on the issue
posed in Raphan. It is unclear how a general partner's guarantee of
a nonrecourse loan affects limited partners' bases in their partner-
ship interests. By overruling the Claims Court opinion in Raphan,
27. Id. at 466.
28. See 759 F.2d 879, 886 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 129 (1985).




33. 1983-2 C.B. 105.
34. Id. at 106.
35. The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 79(a), 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
36. Id See Joint Comm. on Taxation, General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984, H.R. REP. No. 4170, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 250-51, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 697, 899 [hereinafter cited as General Explanation].
37. General Explanation at 251, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 697, 899.
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Congress intended to eliminate the per se rule that all guarantees
are made in a capacity other than as a partner. The House Report
contemplates issuance of regulations that will make capacity irrele-
vant and reflect the position taken in Revenue Ruling 83-151.3 It is
unclear, however, whether Congress intended that the regulations
deny a basis adjustment for all loans guaranteed by a partner or only
those loans of an amount less than the value of the property.
The second notable partnership taxation opinion was Holiday Vil-
lage Shopping Center v. United States,39 which considered whether a dis-
tribution of a ninety-nine percent interest in a partnership pursuant
to a section 336 liquidation 40 triggered depreciation recapture on
depreciable assets owned by the partnership. 4' Literally read, the
Code did not provide for recapture. The recapture provisions over-
ride section 336, but apply only to dispositions of depreciable prop-
erty.42  Partnership interests themselves are not depreciable
property and the transfer of a partnership interest does not effectu-
ate a disposition of the underlying partnership assets. Recognizing
this fact, Congress enacted section 751 (a), which requires recapture
of depreciation taken on partnership assets upon the sale or ex-
change of a partnership interest.43 Section 751(a) does not, how-
ever, reach beyond sales and exchanges to nonrecognition
transactions such as the section 336 liquidation at issue in Holiday
Village.
By affirming the Claims Court decision, the Federal Circuit ex-
tended section 751 beyond its literal terms by holding that the
transfer triggered recapture on partnership assets.44 It began its
analysis by noting that, depending on the context, the Code treats
partnerships both as distinct entities and as a collection of individu-
38. H.R. REP. No. 432 Pt. 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1236 (1984).
39. 773 F.2d 276 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
40. See I.R.C. § 336(a) (1982) (providing generally that "no gain or loss shall be recog-
nized to a corporation on the distribution of property in complete liquidation").
41. See Holiday Village Shopping Center v. United States, 773 F.2d 276, 277-78 (Fed.
Cir. 1985). The recapture provision involved in the case was I.R.C. § 1250, which provides
that: "[i]f section 1250 property is disposed of after December 31, 1975... the excess of...
the fair market value of such property ... over the [taxpayer's] adjusted basis of such prop-
erty, shall be treated as gain which is ordinary income"). I.R.C. § 1250 (1982).
42. See I.R.C. §§ 1245(a)(3) amended Pub. L. No. 99-121, 99 Stat. 509 § 105(b) (1985),
1250(c) (1984) (listing property subject to recapture).
43. I.R.C. § 751(a) (1982) ("The amount of any money . . . received by a transferor
partner in exchange for all or a part of his interest in the partnership attributable to . ..
unrealized receivables of the partnership ... shall be considered as an amount realized from
the sale or exchange of property other than a capital asset").
44. Holiday Village Shopping Center v. United States, 773 F.2d 276, 282 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
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als.45 The Federal Circuit then defined the issue before it as
whether the partnership should be treated as an entity or as an ag-
gregate.46 If the partnership was treated as an entity, the transfer of
a partnership share would not result in recapture; if it was treated as
an aggregate, the transfer would constitute a transfer of the underly-
ing partnership assets and would trigger recapture.47 Relying on
the doctrine of substance over form,48 the Federal Circuit held that
the partnership should be treated as an aggregate. 49 It noted that
reliance on the entity theory would create an anamolous result
under which the recapture consequences would turn upon whether
the assets received in liquidation were in partnership solution.50
Had it considered the issue, Congress probably would have con-
curred in the result of Holiday Village. In all likelihood, Congress did
not intend to exempt property held in partnership solution from the
general rule requiring recapture on depreciable assets distributed in
section 336 liquidations. Otherwise, corporations could currently
reduce ordinary income and indefinitely defer recapture by liquidat-
ing under section 336. And, the recipient shareholders might avoid
the recapture tax altogether because their stepped-up basis in their
partnership interests51 might flow through to the partnership
assets.
52
In reaching its result in Holiday Village, however, the Federal Cir-
cuit caught on two snags. First, by framing its opinion around the
general choice between the entity and aggregate theories of partner-
ship taxation, the court raised the prospect that a single term, "part-
nership interest," might have different meanings in different
contexts. Generally, unless explicitly stated otherwise, a partner-
ship share is treated under the Code as an interest in a distinct en-
tity.53 By raising doubt as to this generalization, Holiday Village
45. Id. at 279 (relying on H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 59, reprinted in 1954
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5280, 5319-20).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935) (refusing to "exalt artifice above
reality").
49. See Holiday Village Shopping Center v. United States, 773 F.2d 276, 280 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
50. Id.
51. See I.R.C. § 331 (1982) (treating amounts received by shareholder in complete liqui-
dation as full payment in exchange for stock); I.R.C. § 334 (1982) (basis of property received
in complete liquidation in which gain or loss is recognized is fair market value of such prop-
erty at time of liquidation).
52. If a partnership makes a section 754 election, it steps up its basis in partnership
assets on the transfer of a partnership interest. I.R.C. § 743(b) (1984). Such step up would
reduce the amount of any subsequent recapture.
53. See Rev. Rul. 75-62. 1975-1 C.B. 188.
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opens a can of worms. 54 For instance, the aggregate theory sug-
gests that there should also be recognition on assets, such as LIFO
inventory and installment receivables, for which there is normally
recognition in a section 336 liquidation,5 5 even if those assets are
held in partnership solution. Yet, since a sale of a partnership inter-
est does not trigger recognition on such assets, it is unlikely that
Congress would have intended recognition on them when distrib-
uted pursuant to a section 336 liquidation. Holiday Village does not
require recapture of such items, but by making the aggregate theory
potentially applicable to them, the case injects an element of uncer-
tainty into the law.
Second, the court equivocated as to the basis implications of its
rule. A shareholder's basis in a partnership share distributed pursu-
ant to a section 336 liquidation is the fair market value of the
share.56 Assuming that the distribution does not terminate the part-
nership and that no section 754 election is in effect,5 7 no mechanism
exists to increase the partnership's basis in the distributed assets.
Without such a mechanism, the partner might be subject to a second
tax attributable to the same appreciation when the partnership later
disposes of the asset: a tax recoupable only upon ultimate disposi-
tion of the partnership interest. In discussing the basis implications
of its decision, the court might have indicated satisfaction with the
general tax rule that keeps the bases in partnership interests and
assets distinct, or have extended its aggregate analysis to step up the
partnership's basis in its assets. In fact it did neither. It said that the
issue of basis was not before it and that the Department of Justice
had made assurances that a basis adjustment was available.58 The
court's sidestep of this problem is incongruous with the overall
tenor of its opinion. If, as its ultimate holding implies, the court was
concerned with rationalizing the tax system, it should not have shut
54. Holiday Village Shopping Center v. United States, 773 F.2d 276 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
was not the first authority to do so. Prior to that case, the Service had adopted an aggregate
analysis to require recognition of gain inherent in installment obligation receivables owned by
a partnership upon transfer of an interest in such partnership. See Rev. Rul, 60-352, 1960-2
C.B. 208.
55. See I.R.C. § 336(b) (1982) (treating LIFO recapture as gain to the corporation upon
distribution of LIFO inventory in liquidation); I.R.C. § 453(h) (1984) (recognizing gain inher-
ent in installment receivables upon distribution in liquidation).
56. See I.R.C. § 334(a) (1982).
57. A partnership termination would pass up the partner's basis in his partnership inter-
est to the partnership assets by triggering a constructive distribution and recontribution of the
partnership assets. See I.R.C. §§ 723, 732(b) (1984); Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(l)(iv) (1984);
McKEE, NELSON & WHITMORE, TAxATION OF PARTNERSHIPS 12.05[2][d] (1985). A section
754 election permits a partnership to adjust its basis in its assets upon the exchange of a
partnership interest. See I.R.C. § 743(b) (1984).
58. Holiday Village Shopping Center v. United States, 773 F.2d 276, 281 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
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its eyes so readily to the basis implications of its rule.59
The degree to which Holiday Village deviates from the literal lan-
guage of the Code is suggested by the legislative response to that
case. Satisfied with the result in Holiday Village, but apparently con-
cerned that other courts would not reach it, Congress subsequently
enacted Code section 386,60 which treats a corporate distribution of
a partnership interest as a distribution of the corporation's propor-
tionate share of the partnership's recognition property for purposes
of determining amount and character of gain.6 1 Interestingly, Con-
gress created no mechanism by which the partner's basis would pass
through to partnership assets in the absence of a partnership termi-
nation or section 754 election.
II. INCOME TAX ACCOUNTING
Another facet of the Federal Circuit's equitable orientation sur-
faced in its opinions regarding income tax accounting in which it
demonstrated a willingness to read regulatory language expansively
to comport with business realities. In reaching its conclusions, the
court departed from positions held by other circuits and the Inter-
nal Revenue Service.
In Hughes Properties, Inc. v. United States,62 the question presented
was whether amounts registered on progressive slot machines63 met
the all events test64 when local gaming commission regulations pro-
hibited turning back the payoff indicators to lesser amounts. 65 Prior
59. The decision also creates a recapture problem similar to that already existing under
section 751(a)-that the recapture provision may recharacterize gain twice: once, on the re-
ceipt of the interest in liquidation, and again, on the subsequent sale or exchange of partner-
ship property. See McKEE, supra note 57, 16.03[3], at 16-29. "All or a portion of the
recapture items that cause the seller of a partnership interest to be taxed at ordinary income
tax rates may also generate ordinary income to the purchaser of the interest" if no section 754
election is in place. Id.
For criticism of Holiday Village, see McKEE, supra note 57, 15.07[2], at S15-22.
60. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, §§ 5761, 7701 (1984) (codified at I.R.C. § 386
(1984)).
61. See I.R.C. § 386(a) (1984) "For purposes of determining the amount (and character)
of gain recognized by a corporation on any distribution of an interest in a partnership, the
distribution shall be treated in the same manner as if it included a property distribution con-
sisting of the corporation's proportionate share of the recognition property of such partner-
ship." See also General Explanation, supra note 36, at 237.
62. See 760 F.2d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 1985), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 2092 (1986).
63. A progressive slot machine is one with a guaranteed jackpot which is automatically
increased, by a pre-set ratio, as the machine accumulates money.
64. See Treas. Reg. § IA61-1(a)(2) (1984) ("[ulnder an accrual method of accounting, an
expense is deductible for the taxable year in which all of the events have occurred which
determine the fact of liability and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable
accuracy").
65. Hughes Properties, Inc. v. United States, 760 F.2d 1292, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 1985), affW,
106 S. Ct. 2092 (1986).
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 35:1097
to Hughes Properties, the Ninth Circuit, in Nightingale v. United States,6"
had held that the test was not met: that the winning of the jackpot
was the event that determined the fact of liability.6 7 In Hughes
Properties, the Federal Circuit declined to follow Nightingale.6 8 It
found that a fixed liability existed that was "not contingent upon the
time of payment or the identity of the jackpot winner." 69 The court
went on to state that the taxpayer's accounting method accurately
reflected income: its method allocated the expenses incurred in
producing revenue to the year in which the revenues were earned by
matching the jackpot payable to the year in which funds to pay the
jackpot were accumulated.
70
The Hughes Properties result seems more the product of practical
insight than of careful application of the all events test. The court
did not discuss the possibility that the liability might never come
into existence:71 if the casino ceased operating before the registered
amount was won, no liability to pay the jackpot amount would exist.
If, however, the objective of income tax accounting is to reflect ac-
curately income, the Federal Circuit decision is understandable.
The decision shows an appreciation for the commercial realities of
the gaming business.
A similar tendency was evident in General Dynamics Corp. v. United
States,72 in which the Federal Circuit considered two issues on which
prior authority existed. The first was whether a self-insured em-
ployer met the all events test with respect to employees who had
received medical care but whose claims had not yet been processed.
On this issue, the Internal Revenue Service had already ruled that
such expenses were not accrued until the medical insurance admin-
istrator had certified the employees' claims.73 The second issue was
whether the resulting deductions should be calculated in the aggre-
gate or on an employee-by-employee basis. In Eastman Kodak Co. v.
United States,74 the Federal Circuit had previously required that the
66. 684 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1982).
67. Id. at 614.
68. Hughes Properties, Inc. v. United States, 760 F.2d 1292, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 1985), aft'd,
106 S. Ct. 2092 (1986).
69. Id. at 1293.
70. Id.
71. For a decision attaching great weight to this factor, see World Airways v. Commis-
sioner, 62 T.C. 786, 802-05 (1974) (no liability incurred under contract requiring engine and
air frame overhauls upon completion of prescribed number of flight-hours when plane might
not complete such hours due to sale, grounding, or bankruptcy ofowner), aff'd, 564 F.2d 886
(9th Cir. 1977).
72. 773 F.2d 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2913 (1986).
73. See Rev. Rul. 79-338, 1979-2 C.B. 212; see also Priv. Ltr. Ruling 8451003 Uune 15,
1984).
74. 534 F.2d 252 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
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fact of liability be determined on an item-by-item basis and that the
amount of liability be reasonably ascertainable for each individual
employee.
75
The Federal Circuit permitted accrual of the deduction. First, it
held that the provision of medical services to the employees was the
liability establishing event.7 6 In affirming the Claims Court on this
issue, the court pointed to Kaiser Steel Corp. v. United States,77 which
had held that amounts reserved to meet uncontested worker's com-
pensation claims met the all events test.78 It did not explain why the
provision of medical services rather than the processing of the
claims was the liability fixing event.79 Presumably, it adopted the
Claims Court analysis that the filing and the processing of the claims
were essentially ministerial in nature.80 Second, the Federal Circuit
held that determination of the fact and amount of liability need not
be made on an employee-by-employee basis. The court distin-
guished Eastman Kodak as involving payroll taxes, which had a ceil-
ing computable only on an item-by-item basis, and as requiring only
that the liability be ascertainable, not ascertained, on an individual
basis.
Like Hughes Properties, General Dynamics represents a liberal reading
of the all events test. The case went beyond Kaiser Steel by permit-
ting accrual when there was no statutorily imposed obligation and
beyond cases disallowing accrual of a contractual liability so long as
some contingency existed.' Although not required by precedent,
the result in General Dynamics was eminently reasonable. In permit-
ting accrual on an aggregate basis, the Federal Circuit responded to
75. Id. at 258.
76. General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 773 F.2d 1224, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert.
granted, 106 S. Ct. 2913 (1986).
77. 717 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1983). For analysis of Kaiser Steel, see Levey, Cameron &
Sciortino, Kaiser Steel Makes New Strides Toward the Deductibility of Self-Insurance Reserves, 60J. TAX
74 (1984).
78. For general discussion of this issue, see Note, Deductibility of Reserves for Workers' Com-
pensation Losses by Self-Insured Employers, 32 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 187 (1981).
79. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1304, 1310 (9th Cir. 1983).
80. General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 250, 254 (1984), aft'd, 773 F.2d
1224, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2913 (1986).
81. See, e.g., Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193, 201 (1934) (no accrual of insurance policy
sales commissions that are contingent on continuation of policy); Bennett Paper Corp. v.
Commissioner, 699 F.2d 450, 453 (8th Cir. 1983) (no accrual of liability to pay into profit
sharing plan when contribution contingent on continued employment); Trinity Constr. Co. v.
United States, 424 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir. 1970) (no accrual of obligation to pay life insurance
premium that was contingent on employee being alive when due). These cases are distin-
guishable from General Dynamics as involving substantive and not merely technical contingen-
cies. Cf. United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 441 (1926) (allowing accrual of munitions
tax when munitions sold, despite fact that tax does not accrue "in a technical legal sense"
until assessed and due).
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business needs by easing the tax burden on self-insurers. 82
III. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
The Federal Circuit's departure from the Court of Claims' pattern
of decisionmaking was most apparent in cases concerning interna-
tional taxation. The Court of Claims was perceived as critical of ex-
ecutive positions. This perception seems untrue of the Federal
Circuit, which, in the area of international taxation, adopted broad
interpretations supporting official governmental positions.
The first government victory was Coplin v. United States.8 3 The is-
sue posed in that case was whether Article XV of the United States-
Panama Implementation Agreement exempted United States citi-
zens employed by the Panama Canal Commission from United
States taxes. 84 The agreement stated flatly that "U.S. citizen em-
ployees and dependents shall be exempt from any taxes, fees, or
other charges on income received as a result of their work for the
Commission. Similarly, they shall be exempt from payment of
taxes, fees or other charges on income derived from sources outside
the Republic of Panama."' 85 After exhaustive analysis, Judge Kozin-
ski of the Claims Court concluded that the treaty exempted United
States citizen employees from both United States and Panamanian
taxes. 86 First, Judge Kozinski found this to be the plain meaning of
the treaty language.8 7 Second, he examined the record and found
that it included insufficient evidence to overcome that plain mean-
ing.88 Disagreeing with the government's assertion that Panama
lacked an interest in exempting Commission employees from
United States taxes, Judge Kozinski described three possible Pana-
manian policies advanced by a literal reading of the treaty: recogni-
tion of the special status of the Canal Commission, promotion of the
Panamanian economy by increasing the discretionary income of
Americans located there, and retention of American employees by
82. See Levey, Cameron & Sciortino, supra note 77, at 76 (aggregate approach permits
self-insurers to use more practical and less cumbersome reserving methods, to create more
accurate reserve levels, and to accurately forecast future liabilities for incurred but not re-
ported injuries).
For an extensive analysis of Hughes Properties and General Dynamics, see Jensen, Hughes
Properties and General Dynamics: The Supreme Court, the All Events Test and the 1984 Tax Act, 32
TAx NoTEs 911 (Sept. 1, 1986).
83. 761 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
84. Id. at 690.
85. See U.S./Panama T.I.A.S. No. 10031.
86. Coplin v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 115, 127 (1984), rev'd, 761 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir.
1985), aff'd sub nom. O'Connor v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 347 (1986).
87. Id. at 126-27.
88. Id. at 126.
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the Commission. 9 Finally,Judge Kozinski emphasized that the gov-
ernment had introduced no evidence of Panama's intent regarding
the treaty.90
A five judge panel of the Federal Circuit reversed Judge Kozin-
ski's decision.9 1 The morning of the oral argument, the government
submitted to the court a diplomatic note, accompanied by letters
from members of the Panamanian negotiating team, stating that the
treaty was not intended to affect United States taxation of its citizen
employees.9 2 The opinion of the court denied a motion to strike the
submission and, in a single paragraph, found that both parties to the
treaty intended no exemption for United States citizen from United
States taxation. 93 In a concurring opinion, three judges stated that
the late submission was unnecessary to their decision; that a com-
plete reading of the record indicated that the Treaty and Implemen-
tation Agreement Article XV governed only Panamanian taxation of
United States employees.
9 4
The result reached in Coplin accords with common sense. Judge
Kozinski's arguments notwithstanding, it is difficult to believe that
Panama would negotiate an exemption from United States taxes for
United States Canal Zone employees. Coplin also, however, presents
substantial issues concerning admission of extra-record evidence
and treaty interpretation. The thorniness of these issues is sug-
gested by Harris v. United States,95 in which the Ninth Circuit reached
conclusions opposite from those of the Federal Circuit by refusing
to consider the diplomatic note and holding that the treaty unam-
biguously exempted the employees from United States taxation.96
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit summarily disposed of the case. In
doing so, the court looked beyond the record and past technical lan-
guage to reach a common sense position that also comported with
the official government position.
A similarly deferential attitude was evident in Thomas International
Ltd. v. United States,97 which involved the validity of a Treasury regu-
lation issued under the Domestic International Sales Corporation
(DISC) provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.98 To encourage
89. Id. at 132-33.
90. Id. at 146-48.
91. Coplin v. United States, 761 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1985), af'd sub nom. O'Connor v.
United States, 107 S. Ct. 347 (1986).
92. Id. at 691.
93. Id. at 691-92.
94. Id. at 692 (Nies, J., concurring).
95. 768 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1985).
96. Id. at 1242.
97. 773 F.2d 300 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
98. See I.R.C. §§ 991-995 (1982). The DISC provisions have been replaced by those au-
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exports, these provisions defer tax on DISC income.99 For a corpo-
ration to qualify as a DISC, at least ninety-five percent of its assets
must be "qualified export assets," defined by the statute as includ-
ing "accounts receivable.., which arise by reason of [export] trans-
actions of such corporation."1 00  At issue in Thomas were
interpretative regulations stating that a trade receivable represent-
ing commissions from a related supplier to a DISC would be treated
as a qualified export asset only if paid within sixty days of the close
of the DISC's taxable year. 10 In Thomas, a corporation organized to
qualify as a DISC sought to have commissions receivable from a re-
lated supplier treated as qualified export assets even though not
paid within sixty days of the close of the would-be DISC's taxable
year. 102
The Claims Court held the regulation invalid as adding a condi-
tion to the statute. 03 Following the Tax Court, 0 4 the Second Cir-
cuit, 0 5 and the Eleventh Circuit,' 0 6 the Federal Circuit reversed the
Claims Court. The Federal Circuit reasoned that the term "ac-
counts receivable" did not unambiguously include commissions
paid.' 0 7 It went on to find the sixty-day payment rule to be "a rea-
sonable requirement the Commissioner validly imposed as a condi-
tion of permitting DISCs to include commissions due from related
producers in their qualified export assets as accounts receivable."'
10 8
The court observed that if no deadline were imposed upon the pay-
ment of commissions receivable, unpaid commissions could be used
to circumvent the limitations placed upon producer loans to DISCs:
producer loans could be disguised as indefinitely deferred commis-
sion receivables. 10 9
The analysis in Thomas is highly questionable. First, it is difficult
to find the perceived ambiguity in the term "accounts receivable."
The term "accounts receivable" would, in normal usage, clearly in-
thorizing Foreign Sales Corporations ("FSC"). See Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
369, §§ 801-805, 98 Stat. 494, 985 (1984) (codified at §§ 921-927 (1984)).
99. See I.R.C. § 921(d) (1984).
100. I.R.C. § 993(b)(3) (1984).
101. See Treas. Reg. § 1.993-2(d)(2), 1.994-1(e)(3)(i) (1984).
102. Thomas Int'l Ltd. v. United States, 773 F.2d 300, 301 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1261 (1986).
103. See Thomas Int'l Ltd. v. United States, 6 Ct. Cl. 414, 421 (1984), 773 F.2d 300 (Fed.
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1261 (1986).
104. See CWT Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 1054, 1070 (1982).
105. See LeCroy Research Sys. Corp. v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
106. See CWT Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 755 F.2d 790, 804 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 3271 (1986).
107. Thomas Int'l Ltd. v. United States, 773 F.2d 300, 304 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1261 (1986).
108. Id. at 304-05.
109. Id. at 305.
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dude a receivable for services rendered. Second, the purported am-
biguity does not support the regulation adopted. The Code is
silent, not ambiguous, with respect to the time of payment, and, in
fixing a time for payment, the regulation adds a new condition to
the statutory language. The strongest argument for the regulation
is ease of enforcement. The sixty-day payment rule provides an easy
litmus test for separating true commissions receivable from fictitous
commissions receivable. But the open ended statutory language
does not require (and is probably at odds with) that test. 110
IV. TAXATION OF TAX-EXEMPT ENTITIES
A distinctive pattern emerges from the partnership taxation, in-
come tax accounting, and international taxation cases: a tendency to
reach conclusions different from those reached by other circuits, to
read statutory terms broadly, and to uphold Treasury regulations
that add to literal statutory language. These elements are present in
the two cases decided in 1985 dealing with tax exempt entities.
In American Bar Endowment v. United States," 1' the Federal Circuit
displayed its independence. In that case, the American Bar Endow-
ment (Endowment), a section 501(c) (3) organization, obtained a
group life insurance policy for its members, who in turn assigned
the Endowment their dividends under the policy."l 2 Two issues
were presented. The first was whether income derived from the
program constituted "unrelated business taxable income"' " 3 to the
Endowment. Relying on the staggering profit margin of the pro-
gram, its long term fundraising motivation, and the ABA members'
consent to and approval of it, Judge Kozinski of the Claims Court
had held that the Endowment's insurance program did not operate
in a "competitive, commercial manner" within the meaning of Dis-
abled Veterans v. United States, 1 4 and therefore did not constitute a
trade or business.1 5 He had also noted that because the amounts
received from the program exceeded the value of the services pro-
vided by the Endowment, the money had not been earned "from the
110. For comprehensive analysis of Thomas, see Comment, Thomas International, Ltd. v.
United States: Regulations in DISCord, 38 TAx LAw. 715 (1984).
111. 761 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2426 (1986).
112. Id. at 1574.
113. I.R.C. § 512(a) (1984).
114. 650 F.2d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
115. See American Bar Endowment v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 404, 409 (1984) (quoting
Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1981) (per curiam)),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 761 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2426 (1986). See also
id. at 408-14 (describing operation of Endowment).
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sale of goods or the performance of services."' "16
On appeal, Judge Davis affirmed Judge Kozinski's opinion.1 7 In
doing so, he first distinguished the case from those in the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits that had held that income derived from
group insurance plans constituted unrelated business income to tax-
exempt organizations. 81 8 He rested this distinction on two grounds:
first, that the Endowment was a charitable organization rather than a
business league; and second, that the Endowment received its in-
come from experience dividends that its members allowed it to keep
rather than from stipends for services provided." 9 Judge Davis also
noted that the Endowment did not compete directly with commer-
cial enterprises because it employed commercial underwriters and
brokers and did not attempt to undersell other plans. 20
Judge Davis next dismissed the government's claim that, by set-
ting its rates according to the rate for other insurance in order to
maximize receipts, the Endowment operated in a "competitive,
commercial" manner.' 2' He said that an intent to maximize reve-
nue alone was not dispositive of exempt status, but that the "source
and character" of the funds must also be considered.1 22 The judge
then found that since the proceeds exceeded by far the value of any
services which the Endowment might have performed in administer-
ing the plan, they were not received pursuant to a commercial ex-
change, and therefore did not constitute "profits" for purposes of
the tax on unrelated business taxable income. He concluded, "[a]
charity should not be subject to taxation merely because its charita-
ble solicitations are successful."' 123
The Federal Circuit opinion on the unrelated business taxable in-
come issue does not withstand rigorous legal analysis. Its grounds
for distinguishing the opinions of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Cir-
cuits are unpersuasive. First, the statutory definition of unrelated
business income does not vary between charities and business
leagues. Second, funding through payment of stipends rather than
116. American Bar Endowment v. United States, 4 Ct. CI. 404, 411 (1984) (quoting
§ 513(c)), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 761 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2426
(1986).
117. American Bar Endowment v. United States, 761 F.2d 1573, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2426 (1986).
118. See, e.g., Professional Ins. Agents of Mich. v. Commissioner, 726 F.2d 1097, 1104 (6th
Cir. 1984); Carolinas Farm Power Equip. Dealers v. United States, 699 F.2d 167, 171 (4th Cir.
1983); Louisiana Credit Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525, 534 (5th Cir. 1982).
119. American Bar Endowment v. United States, 761 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2426 (1986).
120. Id. at 1577.




the assignment of experience dividends should make no difference
when, as here, each participant was required to assign his experi-
ence dividends as a condition of receiving insurance. Finally, the
use of underwriters and brokers at the wholesale level and the policy
of not undercutting competitor's prices does not prove that the En-
dowment did not compete effectively with retail brokers.
The Federal Circuit's opinion also misapplied the "competitive,
commercial manner" test. In adopting that standard instead of a
profit motive test, the Disabled Veterans court was concerned that the
mailing of low cost articles incidental to the solicitation of far more
valuable charitable contributions might give rise to a trade or busi-
ness.' 24 Such concern was not implicated in American Bar Endowment
because the insurance received by the Endowment's policyholders
was worth roughly what they paid for it. 125
Nor did the facts recited by the Federal Circuit differentiate the
program from a commercial enterprise. The fact that the receipts
vastly exceeded the value of the Endowment's administrative serv-
ices did not mean that participants contributed such excess with no
expectation of return. By taking advantage of the low insurance risk
of its participants, the Endowment could negotiate more favorable
insurance terms than those generally available to the public.
126
Whether characterized as a good or a service, this advantage inured
to the participants and was indistinguishable from benefits sold by
commercial entities. Nor did the right of the ABA membership as a
whole to refund premiums change the commercial character of the
operation. Each participant was required to assign his dividend in
order to obtain coverage, and even acting together, the participants
could not have changed the premium assignment policy because
they comprised less than twenty percent of the ABA membership.
Finally, the alleged lack of actual competition did not make the pro-
gram less business-like.
127
In ruling as it did, the Federal Circuit carved out a new exception
from the tax on unrelated business taxable income. Perhaps, as a
matter of policy, charitable organizations should be able to adhere
to long-established fundraising programs without incurring that
124. See Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178, 1185-87 (Fed. Cir. 1981).
125. American Bar Endowment v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 404,412 & n.10 (1984) (finding
that Endowment's rates for insurance were within competitive range in market, at least for
some potential buyers), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 761 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S.
Ct. 2426 (1986).
126. Id. at 407.
127. Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1981) ("Sec-
tions 511-13 do not confine [unrelated business taxable income] to those situations where it is
established that some specific aspect of unfair competition has occurred.").
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tax. 128 Unfortunately, the statute currently taxes such activities so
long as they constitute a trade or business, are regularly carried on,
and are not substantially related to the organization's exempt
functions. 129
The second issue in American Bar Endowment was whether policy-
holders could deduct the assigned dividends as charitable contribu-
tions. 130 In disallowing such deductions, Judge Kozinski required
that each donor show "that an equivalent insurance product was
available to him for a lower price and that he bypassed that product
because he wished to make a charitable contribution to the Endow-
ment."13 1 Judge Davis disagreed with Judge Kozinski's formulation
of the standard and stated that the question posed was "whether the
transaction between the Endowment and the taxpayers involving the
assignment of dividends was of a business nature and not charita-
ble," 32 a determination that must flow from consideration of both
the value of the insurance received and factors such as overall pur-
pose and donative intent.13 3 Judge Davis noted that charitable in-
tent might be absent for those policyholders who attempted to
evade the assignment obligation, but present for participants who
wished to meet their insurance needs while supporting a charitable
cause.' 34 Accordingly, the latter group of policyholders might es-
tablish a prima facie case for deductibility by testifying as to their
charitable intent. 35
The court's broad construction of the deduction for charitable
contributions lacks foundation in law. In its formulation of the is-
sue, the court neglected to mention that the mere desire to support
a charity does not qualify a payment as a charitable contribution.
To make a charitable contribution, a donor must have "no expecta-
tion of a financial return commensurate with the amount of the
128. Without explanation, Judge Kozinski assumed that fundraising programs are not
subject to unrelated business income taxation. See American Bar Endowment v. United
States, 4 Ct. Cl. 404, 409 (1984) (describing fundraising activities as not taxable), aff'd in part,
reu'd in part, 761 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1985), reu'd, 106 S. Ct. 2426 (1986); id. at 409-10 (at-
taching weight to perception of program as fundraising program); id. at 412 (assuming that
fundraising is not trade or business).
129. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a) (1967).
130. American Bar Endowment v. United States, 761 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed. Cir, 1985),
rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2426 (1986).
131. American Bar Endowment v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 404, 416 (1984), a]J'd in part,
rev'd in part, 761 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2426 (1986).
132. American Bar Endowment v. United States, 761 F.2d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(quoting Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 424 (Ct. Cl. 1971)), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2426
(1986).
133. Id. at 1582 n.9.
134. Id. at 1582.
135. Id.
1114
gift." ' 3 6 A mere donative intent is not enough. Moreover, because
of the difficulty of valuing life insurance, a participant cannot be as-
sumed to have had no expectation of a commensurate financial re-
turn, absent a showing that he knew that a better deal was available.
In Greenacre Foundation v. United States,137 the Federal Circuit read a
statutory term broadly in order to uphold a Treasury Regulation. In
that case, the Greenacre Foundation (Foundation) received, by do-
nation, securities that it sold immediately upon receipt. The securi-
ties were never intended for use for the production of interest,
dividends, rents or royalties, and no such income was received by
the Foundation with respect to them. 13 8 Nevertheless, the govern-
ment asserted that proceeds from those sales constituted "invest-
ment income" for purposes of the excise tax on net investment
income of tax-exempt private foundations. 139 According to the rele-
vant statute, investment income included gains and losses from the
sale or disposition of "property used for the production of interest,
dividends, rents, and royalties."'140 The Treasury regulation inter-
preting this statutory language provided that "property shall be
treated as held for investment purposes even though such property
is disposed of by the foundation immediately upon its receipt, if it is
property of a type which generally produces interest, dividends,
rents, royalties or capital gains through depreciation (for example,
rental real estate, stocks, bonds, mineral interests, mortgages, and
securities)."' 4 1 The Foundation challenged the validity of this
regulation.
Agreeing with the Tax Court's opinion in Friedman Foundation v.
Commissioner,14 2 the Federal Circuit upheld the regulation. It noted
first that the word "used" was ambiguous, referring sometimes to
136. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4018, 4180; S. REP. No. 1667, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4831. See Grinslade v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 566, 574
(1973) (test for determining whether conveyance constitutes charitable contribution is
"whether the 'gift' was made in 'expectation of the receipt of certain specific direct economic
benefits within the power of the recipient to bestow directly or indirectly, which otherwise
might not be forthcoming'") (quoting Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir.
1970)).
137. 762 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
138. Id. at 966.
139. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101(b), 83 Stat. 487, 498 (1969)
(codified at I.R.C. § 4940).
140. I.R.C. § 4940(c)(4)(A).
141. Treas. Reg. § 53.4940-1(f)(1).
142. 71 T.C. 40 (1978). See also Zemurray Found. v. United States, 687 F.2d 97, 99-102
(5th Cir. 1982) (upholding Treas. Reg. § 53.4940-1(0 (i)). For analysis of Fiedman, see Rich-
ardson and Jewitt, Is Stock Donated to a Foundation and Resold Right Away a Taxable Investment
Asset?, 50J. TAx'N 110 (1979).
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actual use and sometimes to potential or normal use.143 The court
was not troubled by the fact that other portions of the regulation
employed the word "used" to mean actually used because those
portions were referring to "used" as contained in other portions of
the Code. 144 Instead, the court emphasized that the taxpayer's
reading of the statute would lead to an "eccentric result," under
which a particular stock would be included in the excise tax base
simply because the taxpayer fortuitously received a dividend during
the holding period. 145 The court also noted that the Treasury's in-
terpretation required little effort to administer because it did not
involve individual inquiries into the facts of each case.
146
In Greenacre Foundation, the Federal Circuit read the statutory lan-
guage broadly. The term "used" may include "held for use" but
hardly means merely "susceptible to use."' 147 Moreover, the court's
fear of an "eccentric result" was unfounded. The rejection of a per
se rule that securities are always used for the production of income
does not require adoption of a rule that would characterize stock as
"used" for the production of income simply because it paid a divi-
dend while held by the foundation. Use could be determined by
reference to the taxpayer's intent in holding the securities, as deter-
mined by an inquiry into the relevant facts and circumstances.
148
The result in Greenacre Foundation was not compelled by language or
reason, but represents an acquiescence to an easily administered
rule.
V. TAXATION OF COOPERATIVES AND INSURANCE COMPANIES
Decisions rendered in the areas of the taxation of cooperatives
and insurance companies echoed the themes of broad construction
of statutory terms and of substance over form. In Cotter and Co. v.
United States,149 the taxpayer, a cooperative, earned interest from in-
vesting in short-term commercial paper and certificates of deposit,
143. Greenacre Found. v. United States, 762 F.2d 965, 967 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
144. Id. at 968.
145. Id. at 967-68.
146. Id. at 968.
147. See Zemurray Found. v. United States, 687 F.2d 97, 103 (5th Cir. 1982) (Gee, J.,
dissenting) ("[t]here is nothing ambiguous about the word 'used' and it simply does not
mean 'usable.' "), 509 F. Supp. 976, 979-80 (E.D. La. 1981 (" 'used' in its ordinary sense
means actually used").
148. Indeed, this may have been the rule prior to the promulgation of Treas. Reg.
§ 59.4940-1(0(1). Cf. Rev. Rul. 74-404, 1974-2 C.B. 382 (prior to effective date of regulation,
proceeds from donated stock sold immediately after receipt not subject to excise tax on net
investment income).
149. 765 F.2d 1102 (Fed, Cir. 1985).
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and rent from leasing temporarily excess warehouse space.' 50 The
question raised was whether such earnings were from business done
"with or for"' 5 ' patrons, 52 and therefore eligible for treatment as
patronage dividends.' 53 The relevant Treasury regulation defined
nonpatronage sourced income as "incidental income derived from
sources not directly related to the marketing, purchasing, or service
activities" of the cooperative, and listed income derived from the
lease of premises and investment in securities as examples of such
income.15 4 Looking to whether each transaction "facilitated the ba-
sic purchasing, marketing, or service activities" of the cooperative,
rather than simply enhancing its overall profitability, the Claims
Court determined that the rental and interest income in question
was not patronage sourced. 55
The Federal Circuit reversed the Claims Court. In doing so, it
refused to focus narrowly upon whether the income producing op-
erations facilitated the taxpayer's cooperative functions. Rather, it
stated that the inquiry into whether the income was directly related
to the cooperative's marketing, purchasing, or service activities
"must be undertaken by viewing the business environment to which
it is arguably related."'' 56 The court then determined that the inter-
est and rental income at issue were directly related to the coopera-
tive's function. Because that function required large amounts of
capital and necessarily generated a temporary surplus of funds, the
cooperative acted reasonably in preserving its liquidity by investing
in commercial paper and certificates of deposit. 157 The existence of
alternative means for retaining liquidity did not make these invest-
ments less directly related.15 8 Likewise, the rentals, which were only
a minor component of the taxpayer's plan for assuring sufficient
warehouse space, were patronage sourced.' 59
Like the accounting cases, Cotter is more noteworthy for its result
than its reasoning. The court's broad reading of the "directly re-
lated" test stretches considerably the concept of transactions con-
150. Id. at 1104.
151. I.R.C. § 1388(a) (1976).
152. Cotter and Co. v. United States, 765 F.2d 1102, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
153. See I.R.C. § 1382(b)(1) (1976) (patronage dividends, to extent paid in money, not
taken into account in determining taxable income of cooperative).
154. Treas. Reg. § 1.1382-3(c)(2).
155. See Cotter and Co. v. United States, 6 Ct. CI. 219, 228-31 (1984), rev'd, 765 F.2d 1102
(Fed. Cir. 1985).
156. Cotter and Co. v. United States, 765 F.2d 1102, 1106-07 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
157. Id. at 1107.
158. Id. at 1109.
159. Id. at 1109-10.
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ducted "with or for" patrons. 160 By attaching weight to the business
needs of the taxpayer, the Federal Circuit blurred the line between
patronage sourced and nonpatronage sourced income. Yet, such
blurring may be inevitable in a world that demands that opportunity
costs be minimized. By holding as it did in Cotter, the Federal Cir-
cuit acknowledged that business income seldom falls into vacuum
tight categories.
The doctrine of substance over form prevailed in Massachusetts
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. United States.' 6 1 There, an insurance com-
pany sustained a loss on a loan made to an oil company by it and
two other financial institutions.' 62 The issue posed was whether the
loss was attributable to a business other than insurance and there-
fore deductible from taxable investment income under section
804.163 The insurance company argued that it was a member of a
partnership created to arrange the loan, and that the partnership
was not engaged in the insurance business.' 64 Observing that the
taxpayer conceded that the loss would not be deductible if the loan
were made by it alone, the court rejected this argument, reasoning
that there was no reason why Congress would deny the deduction
for a loan made by a single insurance company, but grant the deduc-
tion for a loan made in concert.' 65 To support its conclusion, the
court cited legislative history and treasury regulation.
166
Massachusetts Mutual displayed appreciation of the doctrine of sub-
stance over form. The character of a business transaction cannot
always be changed simply by adding more parties. By recognizing
this fact, the Federal Circuit focused clearly on economic reality.
160. The previous circuit authority finding that interest income met the directly related
test was St. Louis Bank for Cooperatives v. United States, 624 F.2d 1041 (Ct. Cl. 1980), which
held that interest earned by a banking cooperative was patronage sourced. The Service lim-
ited that case to cooperatives providing financial services. See Priv. Ltr. Ruling 8130001.
In other contexts, a need for liquidity has been recognized as providing sufficient grounds
for relief from an otherwise applicable tax statute. For example, debt incurred in order to
meet a need for liquidity has been held not "incurred or continued to purchase or carry" tax
exempt obligations within the meaning of section 265(2). See Swenson Land & Cattle Co. v.
Commissioner, 64 T.C. 686, 698 (1975); Handy Button Mach. Co. v. Commissioner, 61 TC.
846, 853 (1974).
161. 761 F.2d 666 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
162. Id. at 667.
163. Id. at 668; see I.R.C. § 804(c)(5) (1983) (permitting deduction for expenses "attribu-
table to any trade or business (other than an insurance business) carried on by a life insurance
company, or by a partnership of which the life insurance company is a partner").
164. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 761 F.2d 666, 669 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
165. Id. The court also cryptically stated that if the partnership were regarded as engaged
in a trade or business different from its partners because it was a distinct entity from them, the
loss would also be "incurred by the partnership as a separate entity." Id.
166. Id. at 669-71.
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VI. DEFINITION OF INCOME AND WAGES
The Federal Circuit also issued several less important decisions
lacking its distinctive flavor. Two of these concerned the definition
of "income" and "wages." In Wheeler v. United States,167 the court
determined that amounts paid by a trust created by the taxpayers'
employer to the taxpayers' children constituted taxable compensa-
tion despite the fact that payments were made directly to the chil-
dren.1 68 In Incorporated Trustees of the Gospel Workers Society v. United
States,169 the court held that meals and lodgings furnished to em-
ployees who could have adequately performed their duties without
those benefits constituted "wages" under the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act.170 Involving well established principles, neither
Wheeler nor Gospel Workers afforded the Federal Circuit the room nec-
essary to engage in its peculiar brand of decisionmaking.
17'
CONCLUSION
As seen above, the Federal Circuit's 1985 opinions had a dis-
tinctly equitable flavor. The court tended to take a larger perspec-
tive, relying more on common sense than upon technical argument.
It was willing to read language broadly, give words contextual
meanings, and consider commercial needs. This pattern harkens
back to the Court of Claims, which is not surprising considering that
nine of the thirteen opinions were authored by former judges of that
court. Unlike the Court of Claims, the Federal Circuit deferred to
Treasury regulations. This deference may not, however, signal a de-
parture from Court of Claims' practice since it occurred when nec-
essary to reach an equitable end. Thus, the Federal Circuit seemed
more a court of equity than a renegade or taxpayer court.
1 72
167. 768 F.2d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 850 (1986).
168. Id. at 1335.
169. 777 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
170. Id. at 1556.
171. The only other tax decision issued by the Federal Circuit in 1985 was Wilmington
Trust Co. v. United States, 753 F.2d 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (affirming Claims Court's determi-
nation that, under Texas law, income derived during marriage from certain trusts constituted
separate property of surviving spouse and therefore was not includible in estate of decedent
spouse).
172. This pattern is remarkably uniform throughout the circuit. The ten important tax
opinions were spread among sixjudges. The three judges who wrote more than two opinions
all coupled cases displaying equitable attitudes with those deferring to official governmental
positions. Compare Holiday Village Shopping Center v. United States, 773 F.2d 276 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (Judge Friedman adding to literal terms of Code) with Thomas Int'l Ltd. v. United
States, 773 F.2d 300 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Judge Friedman deferring to easily administered regu-
lation), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1261 (1986). Compare General Dynamics Corp. v. United States,
773 F.2d 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Judge Bissell reading statute broadly), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct.
2913 (1986) with Coplin v. United States, 761 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Judge Bissell defer-
ring to executive interpretation of treaty), cert. granted sub nora. O'Connor v. United States, 106
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What is the source of this pattern? Three institutional factors may
have fostered the court's peculiar, equitable style. One is the
judges' relative familiarity with tax law. Although tax cases make up
one hundred percent of the tax court docket and five percent of the
district court docket, they constitute thirty percent of the Court of
Claims docket.' 73 Thus, former Court of Claims judges have a
unique perspective vis-'a-vis judges of other courts: they are familiar
with, but not immersed in, tax law. Depending on one's attitude,
this perspective could be a plus or a minus. The court might be
praised as one that does not lose sight of the forest for the trees, or
it might be condemned as proof of the adage that a little knowledge
is a dangerous thing.
A second factor is the court's need to justify its role in adjudicat-
ing federal tax issues. The Federal Circuit's concurrent jurisdiction
over refund claims serves no purpose if its opinions are indistin-
guishable from those of other circuits. Consequently, the Federal
Circuit has an incentive to set itself apart from other courts by
adopting a unique judicial style.
The third factor is forum shopping. Taxpayers who cannot afford
to pay their assessment must go to Tax Court. Those who can pay
will generally find the district court more convenient. Thus, the tax
cases reaching the Federal Circuit are different from those consid-
ered by other courts. First, Federal Circuit cases have larger
amounts in controversy, 74 a fact that permits taxpayers to spend
more time and energy developing creative legal theories. Second,
they present situations that play upon the court's natural sympa-
thies-cases with appealing equitable arguments. Litigants do not
come to the Federal Circuit by accident; they come in search of a
distinctive jurisprudence. And, as the 1985 tax cases demonstrate,
they frequently receive it.
S. Ct. 784 (1986). Compare American Bar Endowment v. United States, 761 F.2d 1573 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (Judge Davis exempting fundraising programs from tax on unrelated business taxa-
ble income), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2426 (1986) with Greenacre Found. v. United States, 762 F.2d
965 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Judge Davis deferring to easily administered regulation).
173. See Peartree, Statistical Analysis of the Court of Claims, 55 GEo. LJ. 541, 541 (1966):
Telephone Interview with Roger Nieman, Chief Deputy Clerk, United States Claims Court
(June 19, 1986) (tax cases made up 32-34% of Court of Claims docket from 1979-1982).
174. See Pavenstedt, supra note 1, at 211.
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